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ABSTRACT
In October 2007, veteran Chechen ﬁeld commander Dokka Umarov
proclaimed the formation of the Caucasus Emirate (IK), formalising
the victory of the North Caucasus insurgency’s Islamist wing over its
nationalist-separatists. During Umarov’s time as leader, the North
Caucasus experienced sustained violence and the IK claimed respon-
sibility for multiple terrorist attacks in and beyond the region.
However, despite the importance of ideology in understanding insur-
gent behaviour, the IK’s ideology and Umarov’s role in shaping it
remain understudied. Using Social Movement Theory’s concept of
framing to analyse Umarov’s communiqués throughout his lengthy
tenure (June 2006–September 2013), this article identiﬁes three dis-
tinct phases in Umarov’s ideological positioning of the insurgency:
nationalist-jihadist (June 2006–October 2007); Khattabist (October
2007–late 2010); and partially hybridised (late 2010–September
2013). The article contributes to debates over typologies of jihadist
actors by highlighting the diﬃculties in applying them to the North
Caucasus and provides a clearer understanding of the IK’s ideological
transformation and the limits to its engagement with external actors.
The article also illustrates that weakness was a key factor in explain-
ing that transformation and identiﬁes several avenues for research
that could further enhance our understanding of the IK’s ideology
and the role it plays.
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Introduction
In October 2007, veteran Chechen ﬁeld commander Dokka Umarov abolished the
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), a self-proclaimed state in southern Russia that he
had led since June 2006, and replaced it with the more explicitly jihadist1 Caucasus
Emirate (IK). In doing so, he formalised the victory of the insurgency’s Islamist wing
over nationalist-separatists in its historic Chechen core. During Umarov’s time as leader,
the North Caucasus experienced sustained violence, and attacks that ﬁt virtually any
deﬁnition of terrorism—the contested nature of which is well documented2—have been
perpetrated in and beyond the region and claimed by the IK. Russia, the U.S., and the UK
have all proscribed the IK as a terrorist organisation.
Ideology is important for understanding insurgent behaviour—helping shape identity,
legitimise actions, and mobilise support—yet the IK’s ideology and Umarov’s role in
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forming it remain understudied. Existing work largely neglects the post-proclamation
evolution of that ideology, and that which exists often relies on secondary sources and
typologies of ideologies not fully compatible with the North Caucasus. Using Social
Movement Theory’s (SMT) concept of framing, this article analyses an extensive body of
Umarov’s communiqués spanning his tenure as leader (from his ascension to the ChRI
presidency in June 2006 through to his death in September 2013) to assess how he
positioned the movement ideologically, as a ﬁrst step to addressing these shortcomings. In
doing so, it identiﬁes three distinct phases: nationalist-jihadist (June 2006–October 2007);
Khattabist (October 2007–late 2010); and partially hybridised (late 2010–September 2013).
The article thus contributes to existing typologies of jihadist ideologies by highlighting the
problems that arise in applying to the North Caucasus concepts drawn from the study of
predominantly Arabic-speaking groups in Muslim-majority countries, provides a clearer
understanding of the limits of the IK’s ideological transformation and its engagement with
external actors, and illustrates the ways in which leaders such as Umarov—who do not
necessarily enjoy strong ideological credentials—justify the conﬂicts they are engaged in. It
also suggests that weakness was a key factor in driving change and identiﬁes several avenues
for research that could enhance our understanding of the IK’s ideology and the role it plays.
Assessing the contemporary insurgency’s ideological evolution
The contemporary North Caucasus insurgency has its origins in the First and Second
Chechen Wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2002). The ideology of the Chechen leadership
during the ﬁrst war was predominantly nationalist-separatist, with Islam playing only a
subsidiary, instrumental role.3 However, the region-wide process of post-Soviet Islamic
revival occurred in Chechnya in the context of—and was accelerated by—war,4 and a
loose Islamist camp formed within the separatist movement. Strengthened by ﬁnancial
patronage channelled through foreign ideologists and ﬁghters and the simplicity of
their message, this camp repeatedly challenged the authority of ChRI President Aslan
Maskhadov,5 with the second war ultimately “propell[ing] Islamism into dominating
the resistance.”6 Non-Chechen groups played an increasingly important role; although
the inﬂuence of foreign actors peaked in the interwar years,7 by this point the Islamist
inﬂuence was well established. Maskhadov himself vacillated between appeasing and
suppressing the Islamists,8 but his position was weakened by a lack of external support
and the loss of many allies.9 Maskhadov’s death in 2005 arguably “opened the way for
the completion of the Islamization process.”10 His successor, the religiously trained
Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, formalised the regionalisation of the conﬂict; although his
tenure as leader was short—limiting the conclusions that can be drawn about his
intentions—Maskhadov’s former foreign minister, Ilyas Akhmadov, argues that
Sadulayev was probably laying the groundwork for proclaiming the IK.11 Instead, it
was his successor, Umarov, who took that step.
A voice unheard: Obstacles to understanding the IK
Political violence is about more than just physical acts; it is about representations of
violence, ideas, and ideologies.12 Insurgent groups and leaders devote valuable resources to
justifying their actions and communicating their beliefs—testifying to the importance they
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attribute to this activity—and subjective interpretations cannot be disregarded or treated
as derivative of material variables such as poverty or demographics.13 Indeed, if terrorism
is held to be communicative, it follows that there must be something beyond the act itself
to communicate. Ideology can be deﬁned as “a set of interconnected beliefs and their
associated attitudes, shared and used by members of a group or population, that relate to
problematic aspects of social and political topics” and have “an explicit evaluative and
implicit behavioral component.”14 It helps determine in- and out-groups, which in turn
inﬂuences behaviour by identifying opponents, rationalising attacks, and legitimising
actions.15 Nor can ideology be dismissed as a purely instrumental ruse to mobilise and
socialise members: in a recent critical contribution, Sanín and Wood highlight among the
ﬂaws of this argument the basic contradiction that the instrumental use of ideology to
attract support or resources presumes those ideologies to be important to those providing
such support.16 Thus, the successful instrumental use of an ideology may rely at least in
part on genuine belief by respondents. A logical consequence of this is that even instru-
mental uses can precede genuine ideological change, as those respondents impact a
movement’s internal dynamics—a process arguably seen in the North Caucasus insur-
gency’s own ideological evolution. While it is important not to overestimate ideology’s
explanatory power—individual beliefs and motivations may, for example, diﬀer from
oﬃcial ideologies, ideology can serve as a post factum justiﬁcation for actions undertaken
for other reasons, and groups with similar ideologies can behave diﬀerently17—ideology is
clearly an important factor that must be accounted for in any analysis.
The ideology of the contemporary North Caucasus insurgency, however, has received
only limited academic attention, with much of the literature predating or only brieﬂy
postdating the proclamation of the IK. This stands in stark contrast to broader issues of
Islamic radicalisation and facets of the conﬂict such as suicide attacks.18 Several quanti-
tative studies have addressed trends in violent incidents and drawn conclusions about
changes in the behaviour of insurgents,19 but quantitative methods are ill-suited for
understanding the ideational component of ideology. Within studies that have examined
the articulated ideology of the insurgency, a debate has emerged over the extent of the IK’s
engagement with jihadist ideas and movements elsewhere. Some authors argue that the IK
is ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda (AQ) and a member of the so-called “global jihadist
movement.” Hahn, the most prominent proponent of this view, has—in highly polemical
and politicised terms—argued that the IK is ideologically “in lockstep with AQ.”20 In a
more balanced contribution, Sagramoso has asserted that the IK is guided by “similar, if
not identical,” beliefs and shares AQ’s “strategic objectives—the establishment of an
Islamic state in the Caucasus, to be ruled by Islamic Shari’ah law.”21 Others, however,
have viewed the insurgency’s ideological transformation as being signiﬁcantly more
limited. Campana and Ratelle, for example, argued that recruitment and targeting are
determined principally by “local imperatives,” with groups focused on survival rather than
implementing a grand strategy, while Campana and Ducol show that, although IK
websites utilise “global jihadi rhetoric,” they predominantly “reﬂect local dynamics” and,
critically, deﬁne their enemies in local terms.22
A satisfactory resolution of this debate has been hampered by several shortcomings.
Firstly, primary sources have been under-utilised, with many studies drawing on Russian
and Western media reporting and databases thereof.23 In doing so, authors are often
assessing variations in reporting on, rather than variations within, the insurgency.
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 369
Secondly, where primary sources have been used—with some recent exceptions24—they
have often been selective rather than comprehensive, divorcing statements from their
communicative context. Finally, works originating from within the ﬁeld of Russian studies
have often imported simplistic understandings of jihadist ideologies without critically
assessing their applicability. While acknowledging heterogeneity within the global jihadist
movement, Sagramoso’s focus on end goals,25 for example, overemphasises commonalities
in jihadist ideologies—such goals frequently being “vague, similar and utopian” and used
to justify highly divergent strategies.26
Generating insights through framing
Interpretations matter: As Benford has argued, “objects have no intrinsic meaning. Rather
meaning is negotiated, contested, modiﬁed, articulated and rearticulated.”27 SMT’s con-
cept of framing oﬀers a mechanism for capturing and evaluating such interpretations,28
and thereby informing discussions of ideology. The three core aspects of Collective Action
Frames—those that seek to inspire and legitimise activity—are particularly important.
Firstly, diagnostic framing provides the starting point for action by identifying not only
what needs to be changed in a given situation, but also who is to blame.29 Secondly,
prognostic framing involves articulating a solution to the diagnosed problem, as well as
explaining the superiority of that solution to those proposed by others—some of whom
may agree on a diagnosis.30 Since prognostic framing “tends to produce numerous
intramovement-framing disputes,”31 it can also shed light on disagreements within
groups. Finally, since sympathy towards an actor’s goals is insuﬃcient, motivational
framing is necessary to transform spectators into participants.32
Framing and ideology are not synonymous; indeed, the same frames can be used by
competing ideologies.33 Nevertheless, frames can originate from and inﬂuence ideologies34
and, therefore, provide insights by capturing how beliefs, values, principles, and objectives
are articulated. Framing theory has been successfully applied to a range of Islamist
actors35; this article represents the ﬁrst eﬀort to compile the comprehensive corpus of
statements needed to understand continuity and change in the IK’s ideological position-
ing. Umarov served as leader of the insurgency for eight years and oversaw considerable
leadership and generational change. Although he was viewed primarily as a military rather
than ideological leader, he nevertheless had responsibility for setting the insurgency’s
overall ideological direction—a role that is implicitly downplayed through a neglect of
his statements.36 In doing so, he relied on close advisers and leaders within the movement
with stronger ideological credentials, with whom he had to negotiate support in order to
maintain movement unity. This article will thus shed light on how Umarov sought to
position the movement and negotiate competing interests as leader.
Methodological approach
This article draws on 99 Umarov communiqués identiﬁed through searches of four
“oﬃcial” IK websites, threads on the Kavkazchat and Adamalla.com forums, references
in RFE/RL reporting, and broader YouTube searches (see Figure 1). Communiqués of a
technical nature, such as those relating to appointments, were excluded; others were
omitted if the full text or substantial direct quotations were not available or were never
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published, or if videos were in Chechen and no Russian-language transcripts or subtitles
were available. Seventy-one communiqués were thus analysed for this article. While this
cannot be presumed to be comprehensive, it provides a substantial body of primary source
material from which conclusions can reliably be drawn.
Communiqués were manually coded according to a schema adapted from Holbrook.37
Transcripts were analysed at the sentence level, with sentences coded iteratively to identify
content relating to each core framing task: the undesirability of existing society and past
and current grievances (diagnostic); justiﬁcations for and advocacy of speciﬁc tactics and
targets, imposed constraints on the same, and areas and actors identiﬁed as allies and
enemies (prognostic); and appeals to and criticisms of speciﬁc audiences (motivational).
Transcripts were analysed in Russian to avoid potential problems stemming from incon-
sistent translation. Coded sentences were then grouped together; analysis focused on
themes and trends rather than speciﬁc words or attempting to quantify inherently sub-
jective data (although some basic quantitative information is extracted). Rather than
relying on a single analysis of statements, using an iterative, theme-oriented approach
helped ensure similar passages received the same codes and the schema captured all key
information.
Several limitations to this approach warrant mention. Firstly, motivational framing can
oﬀer only partial insights into motivations: Actors may seek to inspire using particular
frames, but it does not automatically follow that those frames reﬂect genuine motivations.38
Secondly, the exclusion of material that was only available in Chechen, while unavoidable,
means it is impossible to draw reliable conclusions about diﬀerences between appeals to
Chechen versus non-Chechen audiences. Finally, the IK’s ideology can only be properly
understood by assessing a variety of actors within what is a diverse insurgency. However, a
key contention of this article is that Umarov was the movement’s primary voice, responsible
for setting its overall direction, and conclusions cannot be drawn about the IK’s overall
Figure 1. Umarov’s communiqués by year and quarter.
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ideology that fail to account for that voice. As such, his communiqués provide a necessary
starting point for a more rigorous assessment of the IK’s ideology.
Phase One: Liberating occupied lands (June 2006–October 2007)
In his early communiqués as leader, Umarov clearly identiﬁed what he viewed as the main
problem facing the insurgency and the region: Russia. He repeatedly referred to Russia as
an “occupier” and the North Caucasus as occupied territory facing Russia’s “imperial
pretensions.”39 An extensive accompanying grievance narrative accused Russia of “geno-
cide against the civilian population” and “protecting war criminals”40—serving to delegi-
timise Russian rule and legitimise resistance to it. The North Caucasian authorities, by
contrast, were routinely relegated to a secondary concern, the “apostates, traitors, cowards,
and outcasts” that Russia used to facilitate its presence in the region.41 For the most part,
Umarov neglected to articulate a separate grievance narrative towards them as he sought
to deny them the status of an independent party to the conﬂict. Actors beyond Russia’s
borders, meanwhile, were a distinctly tertiary concern, with references focusing on the
West’s failure to support Chechen independence. Umarov thus accused the West of failing
to oppose Russia’s actions in the Caucasus because it needed Russia’s oil and gas, and of
reducing Chechnya to a bargaining chip:
If the Russians refuse them something, they remember Chechnya. After they receive what
they need, they take Chechnya oﬀ the agenda.42
Thus, he demonstrated deep disillusionment with the West, without elevating it to the
status of an enemy or undermining the focus on Russia as the core problem. Umarov’s
medium-term goals were clear and ﬂowed naturally from this prioritisation, calling for
“driving the occupier from the Caucasus” and ﬁghting “until Russia clears our lands of the
presence of its criminal armies.”43 Independence was a clearly deﬁned goal, even if the
composition of an independent Caucasus was left undeﬁned save for a vague stipulation
that it would be governed by sharia.44 At the same time, Umarov pledged to expand
military operations beyond the Caucasus, while limiting this expansion to military targets
on the grounds that Russians “are in an abject, enslaved state” and therefore not culpable
for state policy.45
Religion as a unifying force
Umarov at ﬁrst struggled to incorporate the expanded constituency he inherited, referen-
cing predominantly Chechen concerns and rights. Thus, in his maiden communiqué, he
insisted that the ChRI was, “from a legal perspective,” an independent state, without
explaining how this legitimacy applied to the broader region.46 However, one thing more
than any other undergirded his eﬀorts to accommodate this larger audience: religion.
Thus, in July 2006, he spoke of the “great signiﬁcance” of Caucasians being Muslim and
accused Russia of:
ﬁghting against Islam. Mosques are closed; Muslim women are kidnapped and tortured. They
humiliate believers, abase religion.47
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Later, he appealed to both Chechens and “all the Muslims of the Caucasus,” depicting
them as victims of the same mistreatment:
Our religion—Islam—is under attack ﬁrst and foremost. The enemy knows that it is precisely
Islam that is our defence, support, ally, and the source from which the people draws its
strengths.48
In emphasising the religious nature of the conﬂict, Umarov relied on three distinct
religious concepts. Firstly, he characterised it as a “jihad,” which was “a condition for the
liberation of the Caucasus.”49 Secondly, he depicted jihad as fard al-ayn, a religious
obligation incumbent on all Muslims, applicable to all ages, those who had left the conﬂict
zone, and those who were unable to join the insurgency.50 Finally, he appealed to the
umma, the global community of Muslims, calling on them to remember and support their
“brothers and sisters” in the Caucasus.51 All three concepts were ready-made and readily
understood. Jihad and fard al-ayn are both widely recognised, and the latter satisﬁes the
motivational need for audiences to be convinced of the legitimacy of their actions.52 It is
also not necessary to “convince Muslims that they belong to an extra-territorial commu-
nity—the umma is a well-established historical concept.”53 Umarov could therefore call on
an existing sense of common identity, rather than having to construct one. Religion and
religious concepts had a clear motivational component, permitting Umarov to appeal to a
broader group without need for sophisticated rhetoric or complex argumentation—talents
that to all appearances were not part of his leadership skill set.
A national-jihadist ideology
Umarov’s communiqués at the start of his leadership illustrate the problem of relying on
religious rhetoric alone in assessing an actor’s ideological orientation. As Gammer has
noted, “even the most secularised and westernised nationalists have always regarded Islam
as one of the principal components of Chechen identity, tradition and culture,”54 and the
same is true for most North Caucasian ethnic groups. Moreover, Islam is often seen as the
only force that has historically been able to unite the region,55 and in using religion,
Umarov followed a path well trodden by previous insurgent leaders seeking regional
support. While his characterisation of the conﬂict as jihad means labelling him as a
jihadist was technically correct, this label reveals little of how Umarov sought to position
the movement ideologically. In this ﬁrst phase, Umarov clearly diagnosed the problems
facing the insurgency and the region: The North Caucasus, by rights independent, was
occupied by a colonial Russia guilty of war crimes and supported only by the worst
segments of North Caucasian society. The solution was simple: the liberation of the region
and the establishment of an independent state. External actors were peripheral to both
problem and solution, with the West little more than a source of disappointment for its
failure to support this goal. Of 11 communiqués, four of ﬁve explicitly identify an
audience focused on North Caucasians at home and abroad, and only one on Muslims
outside the region (see Figure 2).
Umarov’s positioning of the movement can thus be seen as distinct from any transna-
tional agenda. The insurgency’s ideology at this time is often referred to as irredentist
jihadist,56 dedicated to liberating historically Islamic lands from non-Muslim occupation
and establishing a sharia state.57 While Umarov’s communiqués during this phase clearly
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conform to these criteria, this label and existing deﬁnitions thereof fail to explore the
diﬀerence between irredentist jihadism and national-separatism pursued by Islamic actors.
Actors as divergent as Chechen nationalist-separatists and AQ were equally dedicated to
liberating historically Muslim lands from non-Muslim occupation, and it is the interpre-
tation of, rather than the mere call for, sharia that signals adherence to an extremist
interpretation of Islam. A more helpful term for this type of ideology might be national-
jihadism: sharing many of the goals of national-separatism—an independent state in
which Islam plays a leading role—but diﬀering in the prioritisation of religion as a
deﬁning characteristic of both diagnosis and prognosis.58
Phase Two: A transnational struggle against local enemies (October 2007–
late 2010)
The proclamation of the IK signiﬁcantly transformed the way in which the conﬂict was
framed,59 with a marked change in vocabulary:
I, emir of the Caucasus mujahidin, reject everything connected to the taghut [tyrant]. I reject
all inﬁdel laws that have been established in the world. I reject all laws and systems that the
non-believers have established on Caucasus lands. I reject, I declare illegal, all those names
with which non-believers divide Muslims.60
Religion became not only the primary deﬁning characteristic of the conﬂict itself, but
also of its protagonists, with Umarov describing Russia predominantly as kaﬃr (inﬁdel)
rather than occupier (see Figure 3). He continued to accuse Russia of “genocide,” but now
it was genocide against Muslims.61 Similarly, he rebranded the local authorities as mur-
tady/verootstupniki (apostates) and munaﬁq (hypocrites).62 The shift was less pronounced
only because of the sheer variety of derisory terms used. The proclamation also introduced
a greater focus on aﬀairs outside Russia, with Umarov claiming “the whole world of non-
believers and apostates” is ﬁghting against Muslims.63 Several frames were transformed:
the West’s failure to sanction Russia, for example, was recast as being driven by a religious
rather than economic agenda.64 Umarov also sought a closer alignment with the Muslim
world, declaring the North Caucasus an “integral part of the Muslim umma” and that “all
Figure 2. Explicit appeals to audiences: Phase One.
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who have attacked Muslims, no matter where they are located, are our enemies.”65
Congratulations on key religious holidays also became a routine feature of communiqués.
At the same time, Umarov became more equivocal in his long-term vision for the region.
Instead of advocating the creation of a Caucasian (rather than Chechen) state, he claimed this
state already existed but was “occupied by inﬁdels and apostates” and required transformation
from Dar al-Harb, the abode of war, to Dar al-Islam.66 Implementing sharia became a primary
goal, with Umarov repeatedly claiming that people had joined the insurgency for the express
purpose of establishing it.67 This subtle shift in emphasis changed the focus from result
(independence) to process (eliminating Russian inﬂuence). Umarov pre-emptively rejected
accusations he was “creating an abstract, virtual state,” but nevertheless refused to deﬁne its
borders.68 He continued to threaten operations beyond the Caucasus, but now with the aim of
“conquer[ing] all the historic lands of Muslims.”69 In early 2010, this expanded to once more
include advocating attacks on civilians—a position he was to reverse twice more as leader. Thus,
in February 2010, Umarov blamed Russians for their failure to protest Russia’s actions and
pledged: “Blood will no longer ﬂow only in our cities and villages. The war will come to their
cities.”70 He repeated this threat a month later following suicide attacks in Moscow.71 Detailed
consideration of the rationale behind suicide attacks falls outside this article’s scope72; never-
theless, it is noteworthy that Umarov’s justiﬁcations of his position contained a clear motiva-
tional component: not only did they seek to displace blame for any attacks onto the targets
themselves, but they also appealed to the Russian public not to support Kremlin policies as a
means of guaranteeing their own safety.
The limits and circumstances of the transformation
Umarov’s transformation of how the conﬂict was framed and the movement was positioned
ideologically had evident limits. Religion remained only one characteristic separating Russians
and North Caucasians, with “traditions or customs” also highlighted as contributing to a
shared identity.73 During its 2008 war with Russia, for example, Umarov expressed common
cause with predominantly Christian Georgia.74 Umarov’s references to events outside Russia’s
borders were mostly superﬁcial, demonstrating little genuine interest and neglecting to
establish targeting the West as a goal for North Caucasus insurgents. On the contrary, there
was little change in the priorities Umarov articulated, and he continued to accuse Russia of
Figure 3. Characterisations of Russia.
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pursuing a policy of “divide and rule,” using the local authorities merely as “puppets” to
govern the Caucasus.75 In other words, the transformation did not so much alter the
insurgency’s priorities but how enemies were deﬁned.
There were also speciﬁc circumstances surrounding the proclamation that warrant
consideration. A line following the identiﬁcation of all who attacked Muslims anywhere
in the world as the IK’s enemies has featured prominently in discussions of the IK’s
ideology:
Our enemy is not only Rusnya [Russia], but also America, England, Israel, all who wage war
against Islam and Muslims.76
Less widely acknowledged is that there were at least two texts that can be considered
versions of the proclamation: one leaked by the IK’s opponents in October 2007—making it
hard to draw concrete conclusions about the precise timing—and an “oﬃcial” version released
a month later. The latter document omitted “America, England, Israel.”77 Although the
implications and the overwhelming majority of the document were identical, a decision was
made to avoid explicitly identifying these countries as enemies and therefore legitimate targets.
Just as signiﬁcantly, Umarov himself was not the author: Authorship has been attributed to
various people, including Movladi Udugov and his relative Isa Umarov78 and Anzor
Astemirov, head of the insurgency’s Kabardino-Balkarian branch79; even Umarov later said
it was based on the papers of the late inﬂuential Chechen ﬁeld commander Shamil Basayev.80
The initial references to these countries points to support existing within the insurgency for
explicitly designating them enemies, while their redaction suggests such support was not
universal—demonstrating the importance of looking at statements in context and considering
other actors when drawing conclusions about the IK’s broader ideology.
Further evidence of ideological tensions comes from the time Umarov devoted to
defending the proclamation. In December 2007, he issued two lengthy statements
responding to a meeting of the insurgency’s representatives abroad that criticised the
proclamation, accusing participants of “open mocking of Jihad and sharia” and being
removed from “the reality of jihad.”81 In an eﬀort to delegitimise their opposition,
Umarov claimed it was “diﬃcult to count them as Muslims” and warned that anyone
who “tries to propagate and impose democracy will be regarded as an apostate.”82 These
communiqués were unusual both for their adoption of the takﬁri practice of declaring
opponents apostates and for engaging in theological debates, suggesting Umarov again
may not have authored them. On other occasions, Umarov deferred authority on religious
questions to others in the movement.83 These instances illustrate how non-ideological
leaders can both lend authority to and borrow it from others in a movement to justify
their actions.
In order to further strengthen the legitimacy of the frame transformation, Umarov was
at pains to stress historical continuity, claiming that, regardless of the slogans used, “every
leader of the jihad spoke and acted in accordance with how he understood religion and the
situation.”84 Signiﬁcantly—given Russia is widely perceived as having taken advantage of
the 9/11 attacks to reframe the North Caucasus conﬂict as part of the War on Terror and
those attacks “reshuﬄed the jihadist universe”85—Umarov explicitly linked his disillusion-
ment with the West to the U.S. reaction to those attacks, claiming “after 2001, the inﬁdel
fully revealed its true face.”86 An expanded session of the ChRI’s State Defence Council
Majlis Shura held the following year—at which Maskhadov integrated foreign ﬁghter units
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into the ChRI armed forces and aligned the constitution with sharia87—formed the
cornerstone of Umarov’s eﬀorts to portray the IK as the ChRI’s legitimate heir, with
Umarov claiming he was implementing its decisions.88 This focus on historical continuity
involved some rewriting of Umarov’s personal history, since prior to assuming the leader-
ship he dismissed as an “FSB fantasy” an interviewer’s question implying everyone had
joined the insurgency to establish sharia; instead, he said he joined the war as a “patriot”
and “did not know how to pray.”89
A Khattabist agenda
The proclamation of the IK launched a new phase in Umarov’s positioning of the
insurgency, “eﬀectively signalling the end of the [ChRi] independence project.”90
Defences of the decision emerged as a major theme in Umarov’s communiqués, testifying
to the signiﬁcance of the transformation. Russia was recast as an inﬁdel oppressing North
Caucasian Muslims with the help of traitors, not to the people, but the faith. Although
traces of such framing were present in earlier addresses, the proclamation presented a
starkly diﬀerent overall conceptualisation of what the insurgency was ﬁghting for and
against. In this phase, goals became more opaque and Umarov shifted the emphasis away
from occupation. At the same time, he rhetorically aligned the movement with jihadists
elsewhere and displayed greater hostility towards the West, but without altering the overall
hierarchy of enemies or undermining the focus on domestic aﬀairs. Of 14 out of 25
communiqués appealing to explicit audiences, compared to the ﬁrst phase an increasing
number (seven) appealed to Muslims outside the region, although North Caucasians home
and abroad still accounted for the majority (12) (see Figure 4).
Locating this second phase on the landscape of jihadist ideologies using existing typol-
ogies encounters signiﬁcant diﬃculties. Studies of groups in Muslim-majority and predo-
minantly Arabic-speaking countries dominate discussions of jihadism; however, the
typologies drawn from them can be an awkward ﬁt when applied to groups elsewhere.
Some, for example, have utilised the “near enemy”/“far enemy” dichotomy, typically refer-
ring respectively to the Muslim rulers of the Middle East and the West and the U.S.91 Yet in
the North Caucasus, there are three layers of actors, not two: local Muslim rulers, non-
Muslim Russia, and the non-Muslim West. The North Caucasus authorities’ lack of
Figure 4. Explicit appeals to audiences: Phase Two.
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sovereignty is irrelevant given that typologies are based on groups’ expressed political
preferences. Treating Russia as the near enemy requires that one overlook the importance
of religion as a key distinguishing characteristic in the original dichotomy; conceptualising it
as the far enemy prevents any consideration of a transnational dimension to ideology.
Umarov’s eﬀorts to create an equivalence between the IK and jihadist insurgencies else-
where while remaining focused on Russia reﬂected the ideology of Ibn Khattab, the most
famous of the foreign ﬁghter contingent to participate in the North Caucasus conﬂict, and
may thus provisionally be characterised as Khattabism—inspired by the Palestinian ideologue
Abdallah Azzam, but adapted to the circumstances in which Khattab operated and territorially
bounded—and therefore distinct from the more internationalist agenda of AQ.92 Locating
North Caucasian adherents to Khattab’s ideology within existing typologies, however, also
encounters challenges. For example, a typology oﬀered by Hegghammer distinguishes
between “classical” jihadism focused on local occupiers and “global” jihadism prioritising
the West, with Khattab placed in the former category. However, as Hegghammer clearly
states, “classical jihadism was a doctrine for involvement in other Muslims’ struggles of
national liberation, not their own.”93 By deﬁnition, therefore, Umarov cannot be a classical
jihadist and the changes in Phase Two are lost in a limbo between national-jihadism and
global jihadism. Equally problematic, by rooting the ideology in the identity of its adherent,
such a deﬁnition means that Khattab and local actors like Umarov must be seen as pursuing
diﬀerent ideologies even where rhetoric, goals, and actions converge.
Phase Three: Internationalised ambiguity (late 2010–2013)
From approximately late 2010, Umarov’s framing of the conﬂict evolved further, demonstrat-
ing an increased engagement with the outside world. In a January 2011 communiqué justify-
ing a suicide attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport—an attack with a clear international
dimension, given Domodedovo’s role as an international transit hub and the inevitable
presence of foreign nationals among the victims—Umarov articulated in-depth grievances
about the deaths of fellow Muslims in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, accused
Israel and the U.S. of breaking Sudan apart to obtain its energy resources, and denigrated the
heads of Muslim states as “puppets.”94 On several occasions, Umarov spoke of the “diﬃcult
times” facing the umma,95 and he argued: “one cannot separate the situation at home from the
general situation in the world.”96 In May 2011, Umarov celebrated the “martyrdom” of AQ
leader Osama bin Laden,97 and later he oﬀered condolences for those killed ﬁghting
elsewhere.98 Such an expansion of focus served to equate the North Caucasus insurgency
with conﬂicts elsewhere, with Umarov explicitly claiming the IK was “part of this global
jihad.”99
Umarov increasingly leveraged the notion of jihad as fard al-ayn to appeal beyond the
Caucasus, focusing in particular on “Idel-Ural” (the Volga-Urals region).100 Umarov
singled out this region in four communiqués from October 2010 onwards, having only
previously mentioned it in the “oﬃcial” version of the proclamation, indicating he viewed
it as a particularly likely source of external support. The value of and reliance on
obligation was evident not only in explicit references, but in the absence of an alternative
basis for action. Rather than developing a separate grievance narrative or transforming an
existing one, Umarov stressed religious identity as a bridging mechanism101 that linked
Russia’s Muslims to the current narrative:
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Do not be disinterested, indiﬀerent to those events that are taking place today in the
Caucasus! Here, in the Caucasus, your brothers and sisters in religion are being killed.102
Umarov also appealed to the umma explicitly—rather than to Muslims generally—with
greater frequency, calling for prayers and support: of six explicit appeals, all but one
occurred after late 2010.103
Ongoing limits to internationalisation
As before, clear limits to the transnational dimension of Umarov’s ideological positioning
of the movement remained. Although Umarov was hostile to the West, he made only one
explicit threat to an external actor, when in November 2011 he accused Turkey of allowing
Russian agents to target alleged IK personnel—including one of his relatives.104 It was,
therefore, an external threat with a distinctly domestic dimension. Umarov also expressed
concerns when the possibility emerged that external events could negatively impact the
North Caucasus. In November 2012, he complained that some people operating in Syria
were falsely asserting:
there is no Jihad in the Caucasus, that Jihad in the Caucasus has ﬁnished, and therefore they
supposedly arrived in Syria. No, in the Caucasus there is Jihad, and it is crueller and stronger
than on the territory of Syria. No one helps or supports Jihad in the Caucasus.105
Umarov portrayed North Caucasians ﬁghting in Syria as people unable to (re)join the
insurgency at home. His comments formed part of a delicate balancing act by the IK as a
whole, which sought to support groups in Syria while mitigating the potential negative
impact on the domestic situation.106
It is also clear that the internal debate over the transformation continued. In a lengthy
communiqué issued in August 2011 detailing discussions preceding the proclamation,
Umarov emphasised what he considered to be the IK’s historical legitimacy. Again
referencing the 2002 Majlis, he claimed that Sadulayev had promised to “complete the
transformation of the state” it initiated, but had been killed before having the chance to
do so.107 As late as August 2013, Umarov was still responding to questions from
Chechen expatriates about whether the decision to proclaim the IK had been correct.
Criticising nostalgia for Ichkeria, he highlighted the international community’s failure to
recognise it.108 That he was still defending the proclamation to support communities six
years later demonstrated its controversial nature and far-from-universal acceptance. It is
also possible that internal debates over the internationalisation of the movement’s
position caused tensions with supporters of the Khattabist agenda even before that
internationalisation was externally apparent: A major split in the leadership of the
insurgency in 2010–2011 was led by Aslambek Vadalov, who fought with Khattab, and
blamed by Umarov on Mukhannnad, IK deputy military emir and part of the foreign
ﬁghter contingent.
Umarov highlighted the challenges posed by intergenerational change in justifying the
insurgency’s shift in focus, claiming that young people were “amazed” at the idea of
“building out little Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus,” wanting to “understand how these
plans are connected to the Qur’an and the Sunna.”109 In his August 2011 communiqué on
the debates preceding the proclamation, Umarov explicitly acknowledged that the insur-
gency needed to ground its appeal in religion if it was to be successful:
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It was already evident that people would not follow us, our ranks would not be replenished
under the ﬂag of Ichkeria. . . . We were forced by the times themselves and the new generation
of Islamic youth to proclaim the Emirate.
In the same address, he also referenced regional pressures, claiming that Astemirov had
threatened to proclaim an emirate if Umarov failed to do so. Umarov contested that such
an appeal would have resulted in a “deﬁnite split,” eﬀectively leaving him little choice but
to proclaim the IK.110 These comments highlight the importance of viewing motivational
framing and ideological change less as a top-down and more as a two-way, interactive
process. They also suggest that a leader’s control over a movement can be maintained by
ideological ﬂexibility and accommodating demands from within the insurgency.
A hybrid ideology
Pinpointing the start of Phase Three is challenging, but, in their entirety, communiqués
from late 2010 onwards appear to ideologically position the movement in a manner
distinct from earlier statements. Speciﬁcally, the phase is characterised by increasingly
detailed references to events outside Russia and a gradual blurring of enemy hierarchies.
Whereas in both preceding phases Russia was clearly the primary enemy—with the North
Caucasus authorities a distant second and, despite increasingly hostile references, the West
a tertiary concern—from late 2010, the gap between these actors is much less pronounced.
Umarov devoted greater eﬀorts to elevating the IK’s status vis-à-vis other jihadist move-
ments and aﬀorded more space to grievances about the West’s treatment of Muslims
elsewhere. He also appealed more frequently to the external communities—26 of 35
addresses identiﬁed an explicit audience, of which 19 appealed to Muslims outside the
region and 19 to North Caucasian audiences (see Figure 5). Umarov thus portrayed jihad
as a solution to supposedly global problems. At the same time, he did not abandon Russia
as an enemy or establish goals extending beyond the Caucasus for those actually ﬁghting
in the Caucasus. When the possibility arose that events in Syria could undermine the
insurgency, local concerns came to the fore and jihadism ceased to be a uniﬁed force
driving towards a common goal.
This blurring of enemy hierarchies is far from unique to Umarov. Hegghammer, for
example, argues that many groups now display ambiguous rhetoric and behaviour, and
Figure 5. Explicit appeals to audiences: Phase Three.
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therefore proposes the concept of hybridisation: “the mixing of ideal rationales for violence
and the attendant bleeding of their associated enemy hierarchies.”111 Such ambiguity of
preference is not dependent on the previous existence of clear preferences, and therefore
applies even if the aforementioned ﬂawed dichotomies are rejected. Several studies have
observed this process of hybridisation elsewhere.112 At the same time, the hierarchies in
Umarov’s communiqués were not completely eliminated: most importantly, while he diag-
nosed the West as part of the problem, he did not prescribe solutions directly connecting the
region and the West. Thus, Phase Three may be considered partial hybridisation, with the
hierarchy of enemies and priorities blurred but not entirely discarded.
Weakness as a driver of ideological change
Strain and weakness have been oﬀered as key reasons for the process of hybridisation,
allowing groups to expand their potential support base with reduced costs of alienating
original supporters—since a shortage of support is precisely the problem it seeks to
address.113 Umarov’s communiqués and the context in which they circulated provide
ample evidence to suggest that weakness was behind not just the shift from Phases Two to
Three, but the entire transformation process. When Umarov assumed the leadership, the
insurgency was in a perilous state: the deaths of Maskhadov and Sadulayev, coupled with a
general amnesty that drained rebel ranks, left the insurgency “in a very precarious
situation” and necessitated the replacement of key military and ideological leaders.114 It
was clear that the insurgency needed to expand its appeal if it were to survive; indeed, the
very act of appealing to the broader region indicates the original support base was no
longer suﬃcient. Religion had, historically, proven to be the best means of appealing to the
wider region and provided a ready-made sense of common identity for appealing to and
beyond it.
Umarov himself was initially “ostensibly a nationalist . . . pressured by those around him”
to declare the IK,115 and he himself testiﬁed to this pressure. However, his comments on the
importance of religion to younger audiences suggest that frame transformation was neces-
sary from more than just a geographical perspective. Managing the transition from one
generation to the next is critical for ensuring the survival of groups that employ terrorism116;
if religion resonated more with the younger generation than nationalist separatism, as
Umarov himself claimed, then the transformation may have been critical to a successful
transition, as well as to maintaining both unity and his overall control of the movement. In
other words, Umarov was reacting to rather than driving the ideological change—riding a
wave that might otherwise have drowned him. The persistence of irredentist framing in his
ﬁrst year as leader may be rooted in his own personal ideological evolution, which appeared
to occur later than for the movement as a whole, and the time required for a new leadership
to negotiate relations with other actors. Ultimately, however, the pressures that preceded his
leadership remained and intensiﬁed, and over the course of his tenure Umarov showed
himself to be a highly pragmatic leader who prioritised unity over doctrine.
Perpetual weakness
Some of the key motivational advantages oﬀered from an increasing reliance on religion
stem from its utility in downplaying or dismissing perceptions of weakness. Goals became
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increasingly vague, focused on a process of eliminating Russian inﬂuence rather than the
concrete result of independence, making the failure to achieve them easier to refute.
Jihadist ideology allows for ultimate victory to be portrayed as “not only decades but
possibly centuries in the future, [which] proves immensely supportive in prolonged
asymmetric campaigns.”117 Furthermore, from the start of his tenure, Umarov sought to
downplay military setbacks and perceptions of weakness, and religious framing oﬀered a
means of doing so. Thus, in an early address, he claimed that there were “thousands of
young people” looking to join the insurgency, but resource constraints prevented the
movement from accepting them.118 Later, he portrayed military inferiority as irrelevant
and used it to call for strengthened commitment.119 Killed ﬁghters were eulogised as
having “worthily sustained their agreement with Allah,”120 helping foster a perception that
they are part of “a greater struggle, a cosmic war.”121 Framing the conﬂict as a Manichean
struggle of believers versus non-believers reduced the need to oﬀer the prospect of victory,
since both defeats and victories are part of Allah’s grand plan. The transformation thus
allowed Umarov to acknowledge setbacks—and thereby retain credibility—while simulta-
neously challenging perceptions that the cause was lost. These advantages, however, are
means of spinning negatives as positives: Were the insurgency not on the back foot and
experiencing recruitment problems, they would be irrelevant.
The reason for further transformation in Phase Three ultimately lies in the failure of
this transformation to bring the desired results. By late 2010, the IK had lost more
leading ﬁgures, including those who had been inﬂuential in shaping the IK’s ideological
identity, like Astemirov and Said Buryatskiy; another key ideological adviser to Umarov,
Supyan Abdullayev, was killed in March 2011. Human rights group Memorial argues
security service losses declined, albeit at diﬀerent rates, across the region from
2009–2010 onwards as a result of several republics adopting a diﬀerentiated (and
subsequently abandoned) “new course” that employed societal dialogue and soft mea-
sures alongside security service pressure.122 Umarov’s eﬀorts to attract support in areas
like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan should be viewed in the context of an insurgency
struggling at home, yet there is little evidence that these appeals brought any tangible
results. Thus, the pressures and rationale driving the original transformation remained
in force. The most signiﬁcant change in Phase Three was the attitude towards interna-
tional actors, and developments in that sphere suggest that the insurgency had nothing
to lose from hostility towards the West: Russia designated the IK as terrorist in February
2010 and, although the U.S. and the UN did not follow suit until mid-2011, by that
point the U.S. had already designated Umarov personally, eliminating any lingering
chance of international support. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring and, in particular, the
conﬂict in Syria radically altered the situation in the Muslim world. Aligning the IK with
jihadists elsewhere allowed Umarov to respond to these changes in the international
environment; given the absence of alternatives, alienating the West was largely a cost-
free endeavour.
Conclusion
This article has contributed to existing work on politically violent groups and SMT by
oﬀering a case study of framing by the leader of a movement operating outside the Arabic-
speaking milieu that dominates studies of jihadism. In doing so, it has highlighted several
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limitations of existing typologies and concepts used to classify radical Islamic ideologies.
Furthermore, it has oﬀered insights into how a non-ideological leader can respond to
ideological tensions within his movement and argued that weakness appears to be a key
factor in the increasing internationalisation of the overall ideology. The ﬂexibility and
pragmatism demonstrated by Umarov is an option more readily available to non-ideolo-
gical leaders and oﬀers an interesting contrast to his successor, Aliaskhab Kebekov:
Although impossible to prove, there are grounds for suggesting that Umarov would
have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State on behalf of the entire IK in order to maintain
unity, rather than enduring the splintering of the movement that occurred under
Kebekov’s more ideological leadership.
By systematically analysing the communiqués of the IK’s founding leader and taking a
ﬁrst step towards restoring the IK’s voice to a debate over ideology dominated by
secondary sources, this article has also enriched existing literature on the North
Caucasus insurgency. The article has demonstrated the value of treating statements
collectively, examining nuances and variance in how a leader frames problems and
solutions, and attempts to mobilise audiences. In each of the phases identiﬁed, Umarov
ideologically positioned the movement in a manner distinct from other phases, yet these
changes are only clear when communiqués are assessed in their communicative context.
Some concepts, such as characterising the conﬂict as jihad, are present throughout
Umarov’s tenure and reveal nothing of the shifts that occurred. Ideas and preferences
also rarely appear fully formed; as such, traces of them can be found outside the phases in
which they are dominant, and identifying emergent ideas may help understand potential
changes in ideological direction. By contrast, looking at concepts and themes in isolation
risks misdating ideological change—and therefore misidentifying its causes—and losing
sight of the importance of prioritisation.
Several avenues for further research emerge from this study. Firstly, a key conclusion is
that the IK’s ideology as articulated by Umarov continually evolved. Although Umarov’s
status as leader makes this change suggestive of a broader ideological evolution, the voices
and actions of other actors within the IK clearly warrant consideration before ﬁrm conclu-
sions can be drawn. This is especially true since Umarov’s repeated defence of the procla-
mation points to tensions. There is also obvious space for exploring in greater depth the
reasons behind the transformation and how rhetorical changes relate to insurgent activities
and capacity and changes in the broader political environment. This article has taken a
necessary ﬁrst step, but many more remain for the IK’s ideology to be fully understood.
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